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Executive Summary 
 
Cap and trade programs are increasingly being used to reduce emissions from electricity 
generation in the United States. Cap and trade programs primarily target emitting generators, but 
programs have also included renewable generators, such as wind generators.  
States cite several reasons why they have considered the policy option of including renewable 
generators in cap and trade programs: to provide an incentive for lower-emitting generation, to 
achieve emissions reductions in non-capped pollutants, and to gain local economic benefits 
associated with renewable energy projects. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also notes 
these rationales for considering this policy alternative, and the National Association of Regulatory 
Commissioners (NARUC) passed a resolution supporting the inclusion of renewable energy in 
cap and trade programs. This report explores why states consider this policy option, what 
participation could mean for wind generators, and how wind generation can most effectively be 
included in state, federal, and regional cap and trade programs.  
Including wind generators in a cap and trade program could serve as a tangible incentive, through 
several mechanisms. Wind generators could receive an allocation of emission allowances and 
then sell them to emitting generators. They could receive allowances and retire them on behalf of 
customers when they participate in voluntary retail renewable energy markets. Similarly, wind 
generators could simply retire emissions allowances to make creditable emission reduction 
claims, with possible secondary financial benefit. If allowances were auctioned instead of being 
allocated for free, policymakers could use auction proceeds toward policy goals and could 
consider incentives for wind generators among their other options.  
While other methods are possible, states are now using or considering two primary methods to 
include renewable generators in cap and trade programs that target generation: renewable energy 
set-asides and direct output-based allocation to renewable generators.  
A set-aside establishes a specific amount of allowances for renewable generators, offering 
certainty for existing generators about the number of allowances allocated to them, but imposing 
uncertainty (and reduced value) on renewable generators about future allowance allocations if the 
set-aside becomes too small to accommodate all new renewable energy generators in the long-
term. For regulators and affected generators, the administrative costs of a set-aside may also be 
higher than direct output-based allocation.  
Under a direct output-based approach, allowances are allocated to all generators, including 
renewable energy generators, from the main allowance pool based on generation output. This 
makes all generators part of the main allocation process, reducing administrative costs relative to 
a set-aside and increasing certainty for renewable generators about future allowance availability. 
The primary drawbacks to this approach, relative to a set-aside, are that it has not been used in 
emission trading programs to date, and it could reduce allocation to conventional generators as 
renewable generation shares increase.  
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This report includes sample regulatory language to allocate allowances to wind generators under 
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) using either of these methods. These regulatory approaches 
will also be relevant if future trading programs, especially for CO2, present similar opportunities. 
To date, wind generator participation in cap and trade programs has proven to be highly sensitive 
to transaction costs and regulatory issues. Programs to include renewable generation in cap and 
trade will benefit from ongoing evaluation of “best practices” to improve their design and 
implementation.  
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1. Introduction 
Cap and trade programsa are one of the leading policy choices for reducing electricity-sector 
emissions in the United Statesb [1]. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notes that 
the strengths of this market-based approach include simplicity, excellent compliance record, and 
cost-effectiveness [2]. A number of cap and trade programs have been or are currently being 
implemented or proposed at the state, regional, and national level in the United States.  
• The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 established the first national cap and trade 
program in the form of the Title IV sulfur dioxide (SO2) cap and trade program for electric 
utility generators to address acid rain [3]. 
• In 1999, the 12 states of the Northeast Ozone Transport Regionc implemented a NOx 
Budget Trading program to reduce regional transport of nitrogen oxides (NOx), a precursor 
to ground-level ozone (smog). The program used a regional, summertime cap and trade 
program to reduce NOx emissions from large stationary sources. [4] 
• In 2003, the NOx Budget Trading Program was expanded to 22 northeastern statesd [4] 
under the NOx SIP Call promulgated by the EPA in 1998 [5].  
• In 2005, the U.S. EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), expanding the 
scope of the NOx Budget Trading Program to 28 eastern U.S. statese and establishing both 
summertime and year-round NOx cap programs. The EPA also promulgated the Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (CAMR), which allows states to participate in a national trading program for 
mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants [6]. 
• In December 2005, seven Northeastern states endorsed a regional cap and trade program to 
reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants. If implemented, this would 
become the first binding regional cap and trade program on greenhouse gases in the United 
States [7]. 
• Several bills have been proposed or discussed in the U.S. Senate to establish national cap 
and trade programs for SO2, NOx, mercury, and CO2 [8].  
                                                 
a A cap and trade program for emissions control establishes a total emissions cap for an identifiable group of sources 
of a specific, measurable pollutant; establishes a market for allowances that represent emissions of that pollutant; and 
allows allowance trading among the sources. Though related, offset programs are sufficiently different that they are 
not discussed in this report. 
b Other emissions reduction approaches include performance standards for emissions rates for existing and new 
power plants, plant-specific emissions caps, requirements to use specific control technologies, and pollution taxes. 
Analysis of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this report. 
c Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, northern Virginia, and Washington, D.C. (D.C. is treated as a state for air quality regulation.)  
d Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, D.C., West 
Virginia, and parts of Georgia (Phase 2), Michigan, and Missouri (Phase 2)  
e Includes NOx Budget Trading Program states except Rhode Island, and also adds Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin 
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Cap and trade programs designed to reduce emissions from electricity generation primarily target 
emitting generators. Wind and other types of renewable electricity generation generally have 
lower air emissions than fossil-fuel generation, leading to public policy interest in using 
renewable generation to reduce emissions in the electricity sector. Some states have shown 
interest in policies to include renewable generators in cap and trade programs. They view this 
policy alternative as an incentive for lower-emitting generation that will achieve emissions 
reductions in non-capped pollutants and offer the local economic benefits associated with 
renewable energy projects.  
This report explores why states consider policies to include wind in cap and trade programs, why 
there has been little participation among wind and other renewable energy generators in cap and 
trade programs to date, the mechanisms by which wind generators could benefit from 
participation, and how wind generation can most effectively be included in these programs. The 
report covers methods for including wind generators in emission reduction programs that are in 
use today or under active consideration in current state regulatory decisions, including: 
• Allocation of allowance set-asides to renewable energy 
• Output-based allocation of allowances to wind generators.f  
Because this report is sponsored by the Wind Powering Americag program, it focuses on wind 
generation; however, the practices and regulatory principles discussed in this report apply 
generally to non-emitting renewable generators and in some cases, to energy efficiency measures. 
And while the report provides specific regulatory options for allocating allowances to renewable 
generators under the CAIR, the overall findings of this report are generally applicable to other cap 
and trade programs as well.  
Effective inclusion of wind generation in cap and trade programs has implications beyond the 
CAIR and NOx Budget Trading Programs. Regulations on national electric-sector CO2 and 
greenhouse gas emissions would most likely use cap and trade programs, similar to programs 
already being implemented at the state and regional levels.  
Chapter 2 of this report provides a general background on emissions trading, primarily for readers 
not already familiar with or who would like a review of cap and trade programs. Chapter 3 
explores reasons why including renewable energy in cap and trade programs is considered and 
examines the different approaches by which wind generators could benefit from programs. 
Chapter 4 discusses the specific approaches to including wind generators in cap and trade 
programs. Chapter 5 illustrates the inclusion of wind generators in state regulation in response to 
the CAIR, including regulatory language that can be used for that purpose. Chapter 6 offers a 
summary and conclusions. 
                                                 
f Specific design details of California’s load-based program are not determined at this time, so detailed analysis of that approach is 
beyond the scope of this report. See California Public Utilities Commission. Decision 06-02-032 February 16, 2006. Order 
Instituting Rulemaking to Promote Policy and Program Coordination and Integration in Electric Utility Resource Planning. 
Rulemaking 04-04-003 (Filed April 1, 2004) http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/FINAL_DECISION/53720.htm#P89_1988. 
Accessed June 14, 2006. 
g The U.S. Department of Energy’s Wind Powering America program seeks to increase the use of wind energy in the United States 
(see http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov).  
    5  
2. Fundamentals of Cap and Trade Program Design 
 
2.1 Overview of Cap and Trade Programs 
Emissions regulation options include market-based approaches, such as pollution taxes and cap 
and trade programs, and non-market approaches, such as pollution standards for emissions rates 
for existing and new power plants, plant-specific emissions caps, and requirements to use specific 
control technologies. Cap and trade programs are a market-based emission regulation approach, 
and as such are fundamentally different from non-market regulations, such as plant-specific 
emissions standards [9]. Under a cap and trade program, an overall emission tonnage cap is set for 
an affected sector or set of plants.h For example, the Title IV acid rain SO2 trading program sets a 
cap of approximately 9 million tons of SO2 emissions per year for U.S. power plants.  
Allowances are created that represent a temporary right to emit one unit (e.g., 1 ton) of the 
allowable cap. The allowances are distributed to the affected plants. The primary compliance 
requirement is that each plant must hold allowances equal to its actual emissions at the end of 
each compliance period. However, there is no fixed emission cap or limit on individual plants, 
and each plant’s emissions are not limited to the allowances that it receives. It can purchase 
additional allowances from another plant or it can sell allowances if it has a surplus. 
A cap and trade program has several benefits. The emission cap leads to greater certainty in the 
overall level of emissions than other approaches because the total tons of emissions are held to a 
specific limit regardless of plant operation or growth in the sector. The trading program also can 
help reduce the cost of compliance relative to non-market approaches because it allows reductions 
to be made at plants where they cost the least, rather than requiring specific reductions from each 
plant. In theory, trading encourages plants with lower cost of control to make more reductions 
while plants with higher control cost make fewer. Through trading, all plants have the option of 
compliance at essentially the same cost per ton, reducing the overall cost of compliance to 
consumers and the regulatory impact on plants with higher control costs [10].  
The trading program also monetizes emissions and control investments. Each ton of pollutant 
emitted has a specific cost because it requires the retirement of an allowance that has a market 
value. Plant operators seek to recover this cost in competitive electricity markets, creating an 
ongoing market incentive to reduce emissions to make each plant more competitive.  
While the cap fixes the total emissions from the sector, the cap and trade program does not 
impose a fixed emission limit at the plant level.i Each plant can emit more or less each year as 
long as it can acquire the required allowances. If a plant faces emissions control options that are 
more expensive than the market price of allowances, then the least-cost option for that plant may 
be to forego emission controls, emit more than its allowance allocation, and purchase allowances. 
If allowances are more expensive, it may pay to install capital-intensive control technology and 
                                                 
h Markets for tradable emissions commodities, such as offsets, also have been established. These markets do not 
establish an emissions cap. Because this approach differs substantially from cap and trade, it is beyond the scope of 
this report. 
i Other regulations, such as state permits and New Source Review, do impose plant-specific limits. 
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possibly have allowances to sell. The total cost of compliance for the individual plant under a cap 
and trade program is the cost of allowances retired to cover emissions plus the capital and 
operating costs of any control measures that may be installed. 
2.2 Allowance Distribution  
Many of the effects of a cap and trade program are not inherent to the basic program but instead 
are a function of how the allowances are distributed. Allowances must be distributed to affected 
entities in some way. The distribution design does not affect the overall level of emissions (the 
cap) and may not affect the dispatch of specific generating assets. However, it can affect the 
profitability of individual units, amount of generation from each unit, total program cost, and the 
future choice of generating technologies. Because allowance distribution can affect the 
competitiveness and profits of individual companies, it can be one of the most contentious and 
politically difficult aspects of cap and trade program design. 
The key design features of allowance distribution can be thought of as three design decisions that 
result in numerous possible policy designs. Table 1 shows a simplified summary of the major 
combinations of policy design features, with each arrow representing possible combinations. 
Table 1: Allowance Distribution Design Features 
*Indicates design feature combinations that have been most commonly used to date. 
Design Decision Options 
Distribution 
Method 
 
Free Allocation 
 
Auction 
Frequency of 
Distribution 
 
One time 
(grandfathering) 
Updating 
(reallocation) 
One time 
(grandfathering) 
Updating 
(reallocation) 
* 
Basis for 
Allocation 
 
Input 
 
* 
Output Input 
 
* 
Output Basis for Allocation does not apply to 
auctions 
 
The first dimension is the distribution method, accomplished by either allocation to sources 
without charge (free allocation) or by an auction. This report uses the term “distribution” to mean 
either one of these methods, and the term “allocation” or “free allocation” to refer to distribution 
of allowances without charge. The second dimension is the frequency of distribution: one time 
(grandfathering) or periodic reallocation. The third is the basis for allocation — typically based on 
heat input or generation output. 
2.2.1 Method of Allowance Distribution 
There are two primary options for allowance distribution: free allocation or auction. Under 
allowance allocation programs, the government distributes allowances in a free allocation to 
affected sources. It is free in the sense that there is no charge for the allowances, other than 
possible nominal administrative charges, though of course the allowances have value in the 
market. This system has been used in emission trading programs to date. Affected industry prefers 
this approach because most allowances do not need to be purchased. This approach also avoids 
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the policy question of what to do with the income from an allowance auction. Allocation can also 
create advantages for those who receive free allowances because they are a valuable commodity 
that can be sold in a market. Allocation does not necessarily change current compliance actions, 
but it can change plant profitability (and amount of generation), asset valuation, and future 
investment decisions. It therefore can create incentives or biases. For example, differences in 
allocation between new and existing plants or among different fuel types may provide different 
benefits depending on plant vintage or fuel.  
Under an auction, affected plants and others have the opportunity to purchase the available 
allowances in an open auction. Once purchased, allowances could be traded on a secondary 
market. All generators must pay up-front for all allowances, so there is no free allocation under a 
pure auction,j consistent with the “polluter pays” principle. All emitters in the program have an 
equal position in the auction, so the auction does not create any bias. 
Economists generally consider auctions to be the most economically efficient distribution 
mechanism because each participant makes unbiased tradeoffs among investment in technology, 
fuels, or allowances [11]. Also, the auction generates revenue that the government can redistribute 
in ways that offset the impacts of the regulation or meet other policy goals. It is also simple in that 
the government does not have to determine, track, and administer the basis for allocation (such as 
heat input or generation output). 
Despite these theoretical benefits, auctions are not widely used as distribution methods under cap 
and trade programs, likely because they appear politically unattractive [12]. Under an auction, the 
affected industry incurs up-front costs to purchase allowances, rather than receiving a free 
allocation. Also, there may be controversy over what constitutes a beneficial use of auction 
revenues.k
Although auctioning all allowances has not been implemented in cap and trade programs to date, 
auctioning some portion of the allowances to ensure market liquidity or to generate income is a 
more accepted part of cap and trade programs. The Title IV SO2 trading program auctions a few 
percent of the allowances each year to promote liquidity and price discovery. More recently, the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has proposed a minimum set-aside of 25% of the 
allowances in each state that can be sold to raise funds for energy efficiency and other beneficial 
programs for the public good [13].  
 
 
                                                 
j It is possible to adopt hybrid distribution systems that are combinations of the options discussed here, such as 
combinations of auctions and free allocations. This analysis addresses only the individual options to more clearly 
illustrate the differences among them. 
k State experiences with Clean Energy Funds could inform the use of auction funds as an incentive for renewable 
energy, if that policy were selected. For example, see p. 13 of Clean Energy Funds: An Overview of State Support for 
Renewable Energy. Bolinger, Mark, and Ryan Wiser (2001). LBNL-47705. Berkeley, CA: Ernest Orlando Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory. April 2001. http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMS/reports/47705.pdf. Accessed April 7, 2006. 
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2.2.2 Frequency and Basis for Distribution 
The second parameter, the frequency of distribution, determines whether the allowances are 
distributed only once or whether they are periodically reallocated or “updated.” Allocation and 
auction can both occur as one-time or updating programs, although auctions are usually 
envisioned as updating programs. The third parameter is the basis for the allocation (heat input or 
generation output), which only applies under free allocation programs and is irrelevant to 
auctions.  
 
Under grandfathering or one-time distribution, the allowances are allocated or auctioned only 
once, at the beginning of the program. The allocation basis can vary but does not affect future 
behavior and so is less important than under the updating approach. The acid rain SO2 trading 
program uses grandfathering, with allocation based on historical heat input. The plants that 
received allowances will continue to receive them (unless the program is changed) regardless of 
their emissions or operation, even if they shut down. New plants will never receive allocations. 
Grandfathering with free allocation provides financial benefit to the initial allocation group 
regardless of their emissions, efficiency, or other attributes. Those who are not in that group are at 
a greater financial disadvantage than if they had received allowances.  
 
Under an updating system, the allowances are periodically redistributed (typically every 1 to 3 
years). Most auction systems are envisioned as updating systems in which the allowances are 
auctioned every year.  
 
Compared to grandfathering or one-time allocation, an updating system means that the basis for 
allocation has greater influence on decisions about how to operate the plant. A variety of different 
approaches can be used to determine the basis for the allocation, but the heat input or power 
generation output are most commonly used. The basis will be determined from each plant’s data 
in the few years prior to the redistribution. In each year, each plant's allocation will be 
proportional to its share of total heat input or generation during baseline years. For example, if a 
plant generates 1% of the total power generated by affected plants, it would receive 1% of the 
allowances in an output-based system. Allocation typically occurs several years in advance to 
provide some certainty. For example, in Year Four of a program, allowances would be allocated 
for Year Seven based on average operation in Years One through Three.  
 
Since new plants do not have a history of operation on which to base their allocation, an updating 
program typically includes a new source set-aside. This is a small pool of allowances that can be 
allocated to new plants until they have an operating history, at which time they become part of the 
normal allocation pool.l
 
The updating system is more work for regulators than grandfathering since the allocation occurs 
every 1 to 3 years instead of just once at the beginning of the program. The basic calculations are 
simple, but the process can be time-consuming, and the heat input or generation data must be 
                                                 
l A new source set-aside could be used under a grandfathering system, but because new plants never enter the main 
allocation pool under grandfathering, the new source set-aside would need to be sized to accommodate all future 
generation growth. 
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collected, tabulated, and checked. Quality assurance and quality control of all data must meet high 
standards because each plant's allocation contributes to the calculation of the allocation for all 
other plants, so an error in any single facility’s numbers affects others as well. 
 
Updating allocation has several effects. One of the most important is that it brings new sources 
into the program as they begin to operate. It also phases older plants out of the program as they 
reduce or cease operation. If reallocation is based on an operating parameter such as heat input or 
output, it can affect decisions about future operation of affected plants. Depending on the program 
design, this can be used to promote policy goals (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
The choice of whether to allocate allowances based on heat input or generation output is one of 
the more contentious allocation issues. It can be an issue for a grandfathering or updating 
allocation program, but it is more important for an updating program because the allocation is 
repeated and continues to affect future actions. In any year, the operation of the plant will affect 
the next allocation. Thus, the updating allocation creates incentives for certain behaviors. If the 
allocation is based on heat input, it rewards increased heat input. If it is based on generation, it 
rewards increased generation. In effect, an input-based system rewards fuel consumption while an 
output-based system rewards efficiency in generation.m  
 
                                                 
m Economic modeling studies suggest that updating output-based allocation provides an “output subsidy” that 
encourages increased generation output, which could increase allowance prices. See Reference 11. 
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3. Implications: Policymaker and Wind Generator Perspectives 
Before addressing methods for including wind generation in cap and trade programs, we briefly 
examine implications of this policy option from the perspectives of public policymakers and wind 
generators. Public policymakers expect that including renewable generation in cap and trade 
programs will provide an incentive for renewable energy, and they cite environmental and 
economic public benefits that they expect to achieve as the primary rationale for including 
renewable energy in cap and trade programs. Wind generators could benefit from cap and trade 
programs through several different mechanisms discussed below.  
3.1 State and EPA Rationales for Including Renewable Generation in Cap and 
Trade Programs 
 
Public policymakers in states that have included renewable generation in cap and trade programs 
often view this as an incentive that will provide environmental and economic public benefits. In 
its Guide to Action, a document prepared for state regulators and policymakers, EPA has 
described the potential environmental and technology innovation benefits of using output-based 
standards to promote cleaner, more efficient generation [14]. And in July 2004, NARUC adopted 
a resolution supporting the inclusion of energy efficiency and renewable energy in cap and trade 
allowance allocations, citing the fuel diversity, national security, and emissions reductions 
benefits of these technologies (see full resolution in Appendix B).  
 
In addition, several states that have created energy efficiency and renewable energy (EE/RE) set-
asides under the NOx Budget Trading Program have indicated that they have done so for 
environmental and economic benefits (see Appendix C for specific language). For example, 
Massachusetts specifically cited reduced compliance costs and general economic benefits as the 
rationale for developing its EE/RE set-aside, while Indiana also noted the electricity system 
reliability benefits. New York’s State Energy Plan emphasized the environmental benefits of its 
EE/RE set-aside, noting the benefits of year round NOx reductions as well as carbon reductions. 
Elsewhere, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority has studied the 
effects of renewable electricity generation and noted potential economic benefits [15].  
In addition to the states implementing EE/RE set-asides under the NOx Budget Program, several 
other states have considered or plan to include renewable generation in their implementation of 
the CAIR. For example, Minnesota has proposed a 15% EE/RE set-aside under the CAIR for a 
number of reasons, including that it will support the state’s renewable energy policies and goals, 
provide a financial incentive to support the development of new renewable energy resources, and 
benefit the state and local economy [16].   
3.2. How Cap and Trade Programs Can Benefit Wind Generators 
This section explores the methods by which wind generators could benefit from participating in 
cap and trade programs. Including wind generators in a cap and trade program means allocating 
some portion of allowances or proceeds of allowance sales to them.  
The wind generators can gain additional income by selling allowances that they receive in an 
allocation because they do not produce any direct emissions. Thus allocation of allowances to 
wind generators creates a market-based incentive for increased development of wind capacity. 
Alternatively, some wind generators may retire the emission allowances to make emissions 
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reductions claims or seek higher revenue streams through compliance with renewable energy 
mandates (if required) or voluntary retail renewable energy markets.  
We examine three mechanisms by which wind generators can benefit from inclusion in cap and 
trade programs: 
• Selling the allowances back into the allowance market  
• Retiring or bundling allowances with other renewable energy attributesn to participate in 
voluntary retail renewable energy markets  
• Retiring the allowances to create creditable emission reductions. 
The first of these mechanisms is not likely to reduce total emissions of the capped pollutant below 
the cap amount in the near term. The other mechanisms would reduce total emissions below that 
level because they involve retirement of allowances. 
3.2.1 Selling Allowances into the Market for Emission Allowances 
Once wind generators receive allowances under a cap and trade program, they can receive value 
for the emission allowances (for example, by selling the allowances into the market). If an 
emitting generator buys these allowances and uses them for compliance, then the allowances that 
were allocated to the wind generator will not have reduced total emissions of the capped pollutant 
below the level established by the cap. For illustration, the value of a NOx allowance is currently 
approximately $2000 per ton [17,18]. This translates to approximately $1.50 per megawatt-hour 
(MWh) for wind generation, depending on the allocation method (see Chapter 4). While small on 
a per-MWh basis, this amount could be significant in aggregate if it is received annually, over the 
lifetime of the project. This revenue stream could facilitate the financing of wind generation 
projects that are currently on the margin of competitiveness. Of course, the value would be larger 
if the total value of the revenue stream from allowances were greater, as might be anticipated 
under possible future cap and trade programs for CO2 reduction. In addition, revenues could be 
more substantial if generators are able to participate in allowance markets for multiple pollutants 
(e.g., NOx, mercury, SO2, CO2).  
3.2.2 Retiring or Bundling Allowances to Participate in Voluntary Retail or 
Compliance Renewable Energy Markets 
An alternative to selling allowances into the emissions market is to retire them or “bundle” them 
with the renewable energy or renewable energy attributes to serve consumers who make voluntary 
purchases of renewable energy in voluntary retail renewable energy markets. Retirement of 
allowances may also be necessary to participate in markets or programs under renewable energy 
mandates if these mandates prohibit separation of the environmental attributes of renewable 
energy that the allowances represent. 
 
Generators may sell renewable energy or its attributes to consumers interested in supporting 
renewable energy development. Customers can make voluntary purchases of renewable energy in 
                                                 
n Renewable energy attributes can be sold separately from the generation. See discussion in text below.  
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those markets where Green Power is available as “delivered product,” meaning that the renewable 
electricity is on the same physical system as the customer. Alternatively, throughout the United 
States, customers can choose to buy a commodity that represents the other attributes of renewable 
generation besides the electricity itself. These attributes are generally referred to as renewable 
energy certificates (RECs). In these voluntary markets, some consumers purchase renewable 
energy, or more commonly its attributes, for its air quality or carbon reduction benefits. To make 
emission reduction claims for capped pollutants, generators must retire allowances or transfer 
them with the renewable energy.o Some organizations that certify or track the sale of renewable 
energy in voluntary markets require that emission allowances be retired or transferred to the end-
user as a stipulation of certification.p  
Generators may also sell renewable energy or RECs to meet state renewable energy mandates. 
More than 20 states have established mandatory Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) that 
require electricity suppliers to obtain a certain percentage of their electricity generation from 
renewable energy sources [19]. Whether allowances must be included with the renewable energy 
or RECs for compliance with state RPS policies depends on the implementing rules in each state. 
In states where the RPS rules do not explicitly require emission allowances to be retired with 
RECs for RPS compliance, wind generators could sell RECs for RPS compliance and also sell 
emission allowances separately in the allowance market. In other states, allocated emission 
allowances must be retired to meet the requirements of the RPS. This can be accomplished by 
bundling the allocated allowances with the RECs used for RPS compliance, but this requires that 
administrative mechanisms exist to coordinate across potentially different schedules for the two 
programs. Bundling and retiring allowances with RECs for compliance represents a policy choice 
to reduce emissions below the cap-mandated level.  
3.2.3 Retiring Allowances to Create Creditable Emission Reductions 
Some state or local governments have considered using emission reductions created by renewable 
generators under a cap and trade program as a potential contribution to meeting National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). This can be done by requiring or paying renewable generators 
to retire any allowances that might be allocated to them. These retired allowances represent 
emission reductions to levels below the cap level and might be usable by the state as part of the 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) to demonstrate attainment of the NAAQS.q The EPA provides 
                                                 
o Wind generators or renewable energy marketers should ensure they are meeting emission reduction claims by 
making the appropriate retirement of allowances, if necessary. 
p For example, Green-e, which is the leading certifier of renewable energy in U.S. voluntary purchase markets, 
requires that “to be eligible [for certification], a REC or energy product must, to the extent possible based on current 
law, contain all of the environmental attributes that were associated with that unit of renewable generation when it 
was generated.” (See the Green-e National Standard at www.green-e.org/pdf/Green-e_National_Standard.v1.pdf, 
modified June 19, 2006.) In addition, the U.S. EPA Green Power Partnership requires its partners, which include the 
vast majority of nonresidential voluntary renewable energy purchasers, to retire the emissions attributes of their 
renewable energy purchases. (See partnership requirements at 
www.epa.gov/greenpower/pdf/program_requirements_memo.pdf, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green 
Power Partnership, Green Power Partnership Program Requirements. April 2004.)  
q Choosing this approach as a SIP measure would imply that the air quality planners for the local non-attainment area 
are placing priority on reducing emissions throughout the cap and trade region or that the renewable generation in 
question would reduce emissions at specific power plants that affect the non-attainment area.  
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guidance on SIP credit for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects [20]. For example, 
Montgomery County in Maryland used a purchase of wind generation and associated retirement 
of the NOx allowances to help demonstrate compliance with national ozone standards [21].  
In summary, state policymakers include wind generation and other renewable generation in cap 
and trade programs to provide an incentive for technologies that they believe will provide 
environmental and economic benefits. Wind generators could benefit through several different 
mechanisms. Whether the policymakers’ goals are achieved and the potential benefits of these 
programs to society and to wind generators are realized will depend on effective implementation, 
the subject of the next section.
  14
  
4. How Can Wind Generation Be Included in Cap and Trade 
Programs? 
Once the decision has been made to include wind generators in a cap and trade program, 
program design must be determined. In this section, we examine the two approaches for 
including wind generators in a generation-based cap and trade program that are now used or 
appear most likely to be used in the near-term for CAIRr:  
• Renewable energy set-asides  
• Direct output-based allowance allocation to wind generators. 
This chapter addresses the purpose and design of these structures, as well as the advantages and 
disadvantages of each one. 
4.1 Renewable Energy Set-Asides 
Under a renewable energy set-aside, a regulating agency allocates a portion of the total emission 
allowances to support specific energy technologies, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
and sometimes fuel cells or other advanced technologies. This portion of allowances is reserved 
and distributed to the eligible technologies as an added incentive for development outside of the 
standard allocation process to conventional sources.  
Major examples of these set-asides include the Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve that 
was established during Phase I implementation of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 [22] and the NOx Budget Trading Program opportunity for states to establish energy 
efficiency/renewable energy (EE/RE) set-asides, as described in EPA rulemaking [23] and 
guidance [24]. A previous NREL report provides a comprehensive overview of the role of 
renewable energy in federal air quality regulations, including a summary of issues that affected 
participation in the Conservation and Renewable Energy Reserve under the SO2 trading program 
[25].  
In response to the EPA rulemaking that established the NOx Budget Trading Program, seven 
states have established or sought to establish EE/RE set-asides in that program. An EPA 
summary [26] of state EE/RE set-asides describes the details of these programs.  
4.1.1 Design of a Renewable Energy Set-Aside 
There are several key components to the design of a renewable energy set-aside, including: 
• Definition of eligible technologies and projects 
• Size of set-aside and dealing with oversubscription 
                                                 
r Other approaches, such as auctions or load-based allocation, are under development for greenhouse gas control 
programs but are not discussed here in detail. For example, California’s load-based approach for carbon emissions 
will affect the market for renewable generation, but specific mechanisms have not been determined. In addition, an 
auction process is under development for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast.  
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• Distribution procedure 
• Administrative procedures. 
These components are discussed below. Section 5 provides actual regulatory language for 
implementation of a renewable set-aside under the CAIR. 
Definition of Eligible Technologies and Projects 
Qualifying Technologies. The set-aside regulation must identify the qualifying generating 
technologies that are eligible to receive allowances. The list of eligible technologies will depend 
on the policy decision about where to focus incentives, and usually includes generation from 
wind, small hydropower, solar, tidal, and other non-emitting renewable technologies. Emitting 
renewable generation, such as biomass or landfill gas, can be included, and states have also 
sometimes included advanced low-emitting technologies, such as fuel cells. Since biomass and 
small emitting facilities are usually excluded from the emission cap programs, adding them to 
the allocation system may require including them in the emission cap as well to account for their 
emissions.  
Project Vintage and Size. In addition to the technology, the definition can address the project 
vintage and size. If the main goal is to promote the development of new renewable generation, 
programs may limit the applicability to projects that come online after the proposed 
promulgation of the program. This also reduces possible concerns over a “windfall” allocation to 
long-standing generating resources. That said, including some recent-vintage existing renewable 
projects can help to make them more viable in the electricity market and provide financial 
support to active renewable energy development firms. This trade-off may be a reason for states 
to consider “fine-tuning” the applicability dates in their rules. 
Allocation to New Units. Under either an input- or output-based allocation,s the generator must 
establish an historic baseline on which to base the allocation (typically 3 years of operation). 
While this baseline is being established, the generator cannot receive allocations. Most programs 
establish a new source set-aside to provide allowances to new generators that have not 
established their baseline.t
Directly allocating allowances to new wind generators on a similar basis as other new sources 
provides an incentive for new wind energy development, but does not assist existing wind energy 
generating units. While such units may not rely on allowance value for financing, as new units 
might, they can displace emissions and may wish to make emission-reduction claims. Under a 
cap and trade program, non-emitting generators, such as wind, cannot claim to reduce total 
emissions unless they obtain and retire allowances.   
Size. Most cap and trade programs apply to conventional generators larger than 25 MW to limit 
the administrative burden on regulators of dealing with many small generators with relatively 
                                                 
s See Section 2 for explanations of input and output basis. 
t There was no new source set-aside under the Title IV SO2 cap and trade program. Therefore, new units must 
purchase allowances from existing units. 
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low emissions. Renewable energy set-asides usually do not have to limit their applicability to 
such large projects but may impose a minimum allocation of one whole allowance. For some 
renewable energy generation, especially wind generation, it is also important to distinguish 
between generating units and projects. Wind projects often comprise a large number of small 
generating units (e.g., 1- to 2-MW turbines). To avoid excluding such composite projects and to 
limit the administrative burden for regulators and generators, it is important to allocate 
allowances to an entire project rather than to individual turbines. Further, set-asides can allow 
aggregation across projects to reduce transaction costs while including and encouraging the 
greatest number of renewable projects. 
Size of Set-Aside and Addressing Oversubscription 
 
A set-aside does not increase the overall level of the cap; it reserves a percent of the current 
allowance pool for specified technologies, such as renewable energy. As noted above, most set-
asides to date have been a few percent of the total allocation pool. This is often sufficient to 
cover existing and near-term renewable energy generation; however, it may not be sufficient to 
keep up with longer-term growth. As installed capacity of wind and other renewable energy 
generation increases, it may exceed the available set-aside allowances. If the state has a 
renewable portfolio standard, comparison of that goal with the size of the renewable energy set-
aside could be one indicator of the likelihood and timing of oversubscription. Establishing an 
initial set-aside that adequately allows for future growth will help keep administration simple and 
consistent. However, because set-asides reduce the number of allowances allocated to 
conventional generators, establishing a set-aside that is large enough to accommodate growth 
may be politically difficult.  
Addressing oversubscription is one of the main potential problems with a set-aside approach; 
however, only Massachusetts has actually experienced oversubscription to date. If and when 
renewable generation starts to exceed the available set-aside allowances, there are several 
possible responses:  
• One alternative is to prorate the available allowances as the renewable generation grows. 
This means that the allocation becomes less valuable to any individual wind project over 
time and the value of the set-aside as an incentive for new development is reduced. 
• Another approach is to limit the number of years that a renewable project can receive 
allowances from the set-aside. Under this approach, projects are cycled in and out of the 
program, making room for new projects to come in. Again, this reduces the ability of the 
program to provide long-term economic value to new renewable projects.  
• Another alternative is to increase the size of the set-aside once it becomes oversubscribed.  
A less contentious issue is how to handle an undersubscribed set-aside. The most common 
approaches are to reallocate the unused allowances to conventional generators or to bank them 
for future allocation to eligible renewable projects. Both of these approaches have been 
successfully used in state set-aside programs. 
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Distribution Procedure 
Most current trading programs allocate allowances for free to conventional units based on heat 
input times an allocation factor. The allocation factor is usually the nominal value on which the 
cap is based. For example, the NOx Budget Trading Program cap is based on emissions of 0.15 
lb/MMBtu, and this same factor is used as the nominal allocation factor for most state allocation 
systems. The actual allocation is rarely exactly equal to this factor because the allocations must 
be normalized to meet the cap, allowing for growth in heat input, set-asides, and other design 
factors.  
Renewable generators cannot use the same approach if they do not have heat input. However, a 
common approach is to convert the input-based allocation factor to an output-based factor and 
apply it to the renewable generation. For example, 0.15 lb/MMBtu could be converted using a 
typical power plant heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh to 1.5 lb/MWh. Then renewable generators 
would receive an allocation of 1.5 lb/MWh generated. This method has the advantages of being 
straightforward, easy to calculate, and consistent with the approach taken for conventional 
generators. 
A variation on this approach is to calculate the emissions rate of the generating resources that 
would actually be displaced by renewable generation and use that rate as the allocation factor. 
While this can provide an allocation more directly linked to actual emissions, the displacement 
calculation can be complex and change from year to year, potentially adding to the cost, 
complexity, and controversy of the set-aside allocation. One way to minimize these concerns is 
to use a standard allocation factor but allow generators the option to calculate an actual 
allocation factor if they wish. 
Another issue related to allocating allowances is how to track electric output for use in the 
allocation process. The most effective approach seems to be to require generators to report their 
generation directly as part of their application. Renewable generators typically measure and 
record their generation with billing-quality meters for wholesale sales, net metering, or other 
commercial purposes. This monitoring can be used to document generation for allocation 
purposes. 
Typically, allowance allocations within the set-aside must be recalculated periodically, anywhere 
from annually to every few years. This is true for two reasons. First, new generators will be 
entering the program and need to receive allowances. In some cases, the addition of new 
generators may lead to oversubscription of the set-aside, requiring allowances to be prorated 
among all participating renewable energy generators. Second, new projects often generate more 
electricity after the first year of operation after equipment goes through shakedown and contracts 
are established in the market.  
Administrative Burden 
Excessive transaction costs can prevent a set-aside program from achieving its full potential 
benefit. Renewable developers and operators are typically not familiar with air quality 
regulations, procedures, schedules, and requirements of trading programs and broader air 
regulator programs. Air quality regulators are not always familiar with zero-emitting renewable 
energy technologies, projects, and accepted monitoring procedures. Going through a learning 
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process on both sides requires time and effort. Some states that established set-asides under the 
NOx Budget Program have not yet established the rules governing the application process. 
Some of the components that can simplify a set-aside program and reduce the potential burden 
include: 
• Establishing a simple and straightforward allocation procedure; for example, by 
establishing a default allocation rate 
• Designing a simple and clear application form 
• Allowing aggregation of small projects without burdening the state; for example, by 
requiring a single application from one representative of the aggregated project 
• Providing a simple and clear procedure for continuing allocation once a facility has 
entered the program 
• Providing outreach to inform potential participants about the program. 
4.1.2 Advantages of a Renewable Energy Set-Aside  
Renewable energy set-asides are the best known and most widely applied method for allocating 
allowances to renewable generators. They have been established under several programs (the 
Title IV SO2 trading program and the NOx Budget Trading Program) and in at least seven states. 
A renewable energy set-aside provides a concrete number of allowances that are specifically 
allotted to support renewable energy sources. Therefore allowances can be allocated to 
renewable generators immediately at the start of operation, whereas under a direct allocation 
approach there may be a lag between operation and allocation depending on baseline 
requirements.  
Because the number of allowances reserved for renewable energy remains unaltered over time 
under a set-aside, it creates certainty for both the renewable energy generator regarding the 
number of allowances that are available and to the fossil fuel generators regarding the number of 
allowances that will be allocated. This certainty may be easier to accept politically than other 
approaches that allocate an uncertain number of allowances in proportion with generation output.  
Because a set-aside pool is not affected by growth in the fossil fuel electric generating sector, 
renewable energy sources do not have to compete with fossil fuel sources for allowances. So 
from the renewable generator perspective, a limited but exclusive set-aside is advantageous.  
Depending on the size of the set-aside, in the initial years of the cap and trade program, 
individual renewable energy generators have some certainty regarding the number of allowances 
they will receive by using expected generation and the standard allocation rate, which allows for 
a more likely inclusion in project financing. However, this certainty is removed if renewable 
energy generation outgrows the size of the set-aside. 
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4.1.3 Disadvantages of a Renewable Energy Set-Aside 
Even though a set-aside guarantees the number of allowances available to renewable energy 
sources as a whole, there are two primary drawbacks to a set-aside relative to other distribution 
methods: 
• There is a limit on the long-term availability of allowances for wind and other renewable 
energy generators. 
• The transaction cost for receiving allowances may be high compared to other approaches 
to distribution.  
• Uncertainty associated with the application process reduces the financial value of the 
allowances to wind and other renewable energy generators. 
Most set-asides have been set at 1% to 5% of the total allowance pool. While this may be 
adequate to accommodate the market in the near term, in the longer term it may not be sufficient 
to provide allowances for a growing wind power sector. This leads to competition among the 
wind generators for the limited pool of allowances, reducing the value of the allowances. If wind 
generation outgrows what can be accommodated by the set-aside, allowances are likely to be 
distributed on a prorated basis, decreasing the number of allowances each generator receives and 
reducing the program’s value to new projects. Alternatively, the program may limit the years of 
eligibility in the program for wind generators, dropping them after a few years to allow newer 
projects to come into the program. Either way, the value of the set-aside to wind developers is 
diminished over time. Because of this, a set-aside program is not as valuable to new wind energy 
development as allocation of allowances on the same basis as other energy sources from the 
main allowance pool.  
Relative to other allowance distribution methods, a set-aside program also creates administrative 
complexity for the regulating agency and the electric generator because it treats renewable 
generation separately from the rest of the cap and trade program. Typically, allocations to 
conventional generators are automatic, but wind and other renewable energy generators must 
apply to receive set-aside allowances. In some cases, they must reapply every year. This 
application process can be an administrative burden and create a transaction cost that must be 
compared to the expected value of allowances that might be allocated to determine whether it is 
worthwhile to apply. The regulating agency must administer an entirely separate program when 
using a set-aside, requiring additional resources to review and verify set-aside applications and to 
allocate allowances appropriately across the wind generators. Transaction costs for both 
regulators and generators can reduce the effectiveness and value of a set-aside.  
In addition, the uncertainty associated with the application process means that renewable energy 
generators cannot count on the value of allowances until after the application is approved. This 
reduces the effective value of the allowances. Uncertainty related to the application process is 
particularly high if the requirements of that process have not been formally established, as is the 
case in some states that adopted set-asides for the NOx Budget Trading Program.  
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Despite these disadvantages, some states have had full subscription of their set-aside program 
under the NOx Budget Trading Program. The next section discusses some specific results for 
wind energy projects. 
4.1.4 Experience with EE/RE Set-Asides 
The only active emission allowance trading market today with renewable energy set-asides is the 
NOx Budget Trading program. The NOx Budget Trading Program took effect in 2003 to reduce 
emissions of NOx in 22 eastern states and the District of Columbia. This program aims to reduce 
the production of ground-level ozone (smog), of which NOx is a precursor. Affected states must 
limit NOx emissions during the ozone season, from May 1 until September 30 every year. Of the 
23 affected jurisdictions, only six currently have a set-aside for EE/RE projects (see Table 2): 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. Missouri has established a 
set-aside to take effect when it enters the program in 2007.  
Table 2. Summary of SIP Call Set-Aside Parameters 
* NOx Budget units not eligible. **Starting 2007 
Applicability  Size of 
Annual 
Set-
Aside 
(Tons) 
% of 
Total 
Budget 
Allocation 
Basis 
Length of 
Allocation 
Generator 
Online Date 
RE EE Biomass CHP 
Indiana 1,115  2% 1.5 lbs/MWh, 
discounted by 
75% for 
projects owned 
by affected 
entities 
5 yrs within 2 yrs 
of request 
x x  x 
Maryland 463 3% 2.5 lbs/MWh NA on or after 
5/1/00 
x x   
Massachusetts 643 tons, 
768 tons 
allocated 
to date 
5% 1.5 lbs/MWhe 
0.44 
lbs/mmBtu 
useful thermal 
output 
No limit for 
RE; 7 years 
for EE  
 
after 
12/31/99 
x x  x*
New Jersey 410 5% 1.5 lbs/MWh No limit 1992 and 
after 
x x   
New York 1,241  3% 1.5 lbs/MWh 5 yrs after 5/1/03 x x x  
Ohio 454 1% 1.5 lbs/MWh 5 yrs  x x x x*
Missouri** 134 1% 1.5 lbs/MWh 5 yrs after 
5/1/2006 
x x x x 
 
The set-asides are typically between 1% to 5% of the total NOx allowance budget. The types of 
EE/RE projects considered to be eligible vary somewhat by state but include: 
• Zero-emitting renewables, such as wind and solar 
    21  
• Energy efficiency projects such as retrofitting lighting, air conditioning, and other systems 
with more efficient equipment 
• Renewable projects burning biomass 
• Combined heat and power (CHP) projects.  
 
Projects typically are only eligible if they are considered to be “new,” with the definition of 
“new” varying by state from 1992 to 2003. Projects receive allowances in units of pounds of 
NOx per megawatt-hour (lbs/MWh) saved (by energy efficiency) or generated. The allocation 
factor is typically 1.5 lbs/MWh saved or generated, which is based on the nominal emission cap. 
Depending on the state, a project may receive allowances for up to 5 years or more but must re-
apply each year. Based on current prices for NOx allowances, the value of allocations is around 
$1.50/MWh [17,18]. 
 
Experience with State Set-Aside Programs  
To assess the experience to date with EE/RE set-aside programs, interviews were conducted with 
state air regulators and wind energy developers who had existing or proposed projects in states 
with set-asides. In most states, the EE/RE set-asides have not been fully subscribed, and 
generally very few types of projects have benefited from them.  
For instance, in Indiana, the program has not yet been fully utilized and only landfill gas projects 
have received allowances. Maryland has had applications from two wind projects but has not yet 
developed rules for the application process or granted allowancesu. Ohio has allocated 
allowances primarily to hydroelectric facilities, and also to one wind project, with 80 of the 454 
allowances allocated for the 2006 ozone season. New Jersey typically allocates 10% to 12% of 
the allowances in the set-aside each year. To date, two landfill gas projects have received 
allowances, while most allowances go to energy efficiency projects. New York is now 
developing its rules for applications and has not allocated set-aside allowances to date. 
Massachusetts is the only state in which the set-aside is over-subscribed. There, as in New 
Jersey, most of the allowances go to energy efficiency projects, although two hydroelectric 
facilities have also received allowances.  
Thus, set-aside programs offer very limited examples of allocating allowances to renewable 
generators in general and wind energy in particular. Interviews with wind project developers and 
state regulators identified several possible reasons why participation has been limited: 
Conflict with State RPS Programs. In some states that have both allowance set-asides and 
renewable energy mandates, there can be a conflict between the provisions of the two programs 
that explicitly or implicitly requires developers to choose one or the other program. If the value 
of RECs under the RPS is higher than the value of the NOx allowances, developers are likely to 
choose the RPS rather than the NOx program.  
                                                 
u Montgomery County in Maryland is purchasing some wind power, for which a number of allowances will be 
retired; however, this was negotiated outside of the set-aside program. 
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For example, in New York, wind generators sell to the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Agency (NYSERDA) their rights to claim environmentally beneficial attributes of 
their electricity, as well as the right to transfer that right. Under this program, NYSERDA 
requires generators to include all emission credits with the sale; however, there is no explicit 
price adder for the allowances. Since there is no value placed on the allowances in this market, 
there is no incentive for wind developers to go to the effort of acquiring the NOx allowances and 
therefore none have done so. However, there could be value to acquiring allowances for wind 
generators selling to the voluntary (non-RPS) market. In addition, if there were surplus 
renewable generation beyond what is required to satisfy the RPS, there could be a value in 
acquiring NOx allowances so that environmental attributes of renewable generation could be sold 
outside the RPS. For the present, however, the structure of the RPS is effectively discouraging 
generators from participating in the NOx allowance program because the RPS policy is intended 
to reduce emissions. This in turn has caused some environmental regulators to believe that there 
is little interest in the set-aside program.  
In some cases in other states where RPS and set-aside requirements were not in conflict, 
regulators or developers were under the false impression that they were. Air regulators, energy 
officials, and renewable energy developers do not consistently have a clear understanding of 
each others’ regulations and contractual requirements. Confusion between regulatory 
requirements and contractual requirements further complicates understandings among these 
parties. Language establishing requirements is also unclear in some cases.  
Rule Complexity and Delays. Most states have established their allowance set-aside programs 
and have received at least some applications. However, the process can be administratively slow 
and burdensome. A wind developer in Maryland reported that an application has been pending 
for several years as the state considers the appropriate treatment and pursues a rulemaking to 
establish the application procedure. It was reported that this process has also been slowed by 
pressure from incumbent utilities that are reluctant to see allowances diverted from the main 
allocation pool. Similarly, in New York, while the set-aside has been established for several 
years, the state is in the process of developing guidance and formal application documents and is 
not yet able to allocate the allowances.   
Perceived Value of Allowance Set-Asides. At current allowance prices and allocation rates, 
NOx allowance set-asides are worth about $1.50/MWh ($0.0015/kWh) for renewable generators. 
While not inconsequential, this is not a large amount on a per-MWh basis, and may be 
insufficient to motivate applications. However, others noted that allowances can have a 
significant value as an aggregate amount over the life of the project and in combination with 
other incentives. Some wind developers viewed this as a temporary market condition, rather than 
a fundamental reason not to participate in a set-aside program. Many wind developers are 
looking forward to the expected higher value of CO2 allowances under possible future CO2 
trading programs. They hope that set-asides under NOx programs will establish a precedent for 
such future programs. 
Lack of Developer Knowledge of the Set-Aside Program. Some wind developers interviewed 
were unaware of potential eligibility of their projects for NOx allowance set-asides. As non-
emitting generators, some developers do not think about the applicability and potential benefits 
of participating in an emission reduction program.  
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Despite these problems, there seems to be growing interest in NOx set-aside programs (perhaps 
due to increasing awareness among wind developers). Although the set-aside in Missouri does 
not begin until 2007, a wind facility under development there plans to apply to the program. In 
Ohio, a wind facility is receiving two allowances, and its managers are happy with the EE/RE 
set-aside program. Their main concern is the potential tightening of the program, under which 
eligibility may be limited to facilities that began operation within the past 2 years. If this occurs, 
the wind facility in Ohio will no longer be eligible.  
In general, the NOx EE/RE set-asides have not provided significant value to wind generators. 
Although one facility in Ohio is receiving allowances, the others contacted remain frustrated or 
even unaware of the set-aside program. Conflicting regulations, inadequate allowances, facility 
age constraints, lengthy application processes, or lack of awareness are reasons that wind 
generators have not pursued EE/RE set-asides.  
4.2 Direct Output-Based Allocation to Renewable Energy  
Another near-term alternative to allocating allowances to wind generators through a set-aside is 
to directly allocate them based on relative quantity of electricity generation as part of the primary 
allocation pool. That is, if the main pool of allowances is allocated based on electric output, 
renewable generators can receive their allocations on the same basis as other generators. 
In a recent Clean Energy-Environment Guide to Action, the U.S. EPA highlights the benefits of 
output-based environmental regulations. Section 5.3 of the document states: 
The goal of output-based environmental regulations is to encourage the use of 
fuel conversion efficiency and renewable energy as air pollution control 
measures…States utilize output-based environmental regulations to encourage 
efficient energy generation by leveling the playing field for fuel conversion 
efficiency and renewable energy as air pollution control measures. Historically, 
environmental regulations have been input-based, which does not account for the 
pollution prevention benefits of process efficiency, which encourages the use of 
more efficient generation approaches [14]. 
Shifting from a heat input- to a generation-output-based allocation system facilitates a cap and 
trade program including all generators on a neutral basis, regardless of fuel and emissions, which 
can provide a greater incentive for investment in both clean and efficient energy sources. 
4.2.1 Design of Output-Based Allocation to Wind Generators 
Design issues for output-based allocation to renewable generators include: 
• Eligible technologies, size, and vintage 
• Basis for allocation 
• Timing of allocations 
• New source set-aside. 
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Definition of Eligible Technologies and Projects 
A cap and trade program for emission reductions can allocate the allowances based on output 
generation (MWh) and specify the units eligible to participate. Instead of including only fossil-
fuel-fired units, as has been the case under previous cap and trade programs, eligible units can be 
expanded to include both fossil-fuel-fired and renewable energy electric generating units. State 
regulators will likely wish to define specific renewable energy sources to reflect their state’s 
goals and resources. This process is essentially the same as for a renewable energy set-aside (see 
Section 4.1). Chapter 5 includes regulatory language for output-based allocation to wind 
generators under the CAIR. 
Basis for Allocation 
The allocation method will differ slightly depending on whether a pure output-based allocation is 
used or an allocation factor based on output. In the case of a pure output-based allocation to all 
sources, generating units can receive allowances based on their proportion of output, as 
calculated during a baseline period, which then may be updated. An alternative is to use an 
allocation factor, in pounds of emissions per MWh or kWh. If the same allocation factor is used 
for all energy sources and allocations are prorated to achieve the cap, then the effective 
allocation will be the same as under a pure output-based allocation.  
Timing of Allocations 
Most cap and trade programs reallocate allowances periodically to bring new generators into the 
program. The timing of reallocation can range from every year to every 10 years. A 3- to 5-year 
reallocation is common. The allowances are typically allocated several years in advance to 
provide certainty to generators.  
New Source Set-Aside 
A new unit entering the program typically must establish several years of baseline operating 
data. It will then receive an allocation for an allowance vintage several years in the future. Thus 
there can be a lag of 5 or more years between initial commercial operation and the time that a 
unit actually receives allowances. Most programs fill this gap with a “new source set-aside.” 
These allowances are based on the operation in the year immediately prior or are based on 
expected operation and prorated for actual operation at the end of the year. Under a direct output-
based allocation to wind generators, the wind generators would need to be included under the 
new source set-aside to receive allowances during their early years of operation. 
4.2.2 Advantages of Direct Output-Based Allocation to Wind Generators 
If output is selected as the basis for allocation of the main allowance pool, directly allocating 
allowances to new renewable energy generation including wind generation units provides clear 
support for new development of renewable resources. An output-based allocation method has the 
following advantages: 
• Provides a more stable and consistent allocation stream for renewable sources, relative to 
a set-aside. 
• Simplifies the allocation process and reduces administrative burden 
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• Establishes a basis for allocation (output) that is neutral with respect to fuels and energy 
source 
Output-based allocation is more stable and consistent than a fixed set-aside because new wind 
generators receive allocations from the main allowance pool, along with other generators. 
Therefore, renewable energy sources do not compete directly against each other for a fixed 
number of set-aside allowances. This provides greater certainty that allocations will be consistent 
over time, which increases the financial value of the allowances under output-based allocation 
relative to a set-aside.  
Overall, an output-based method simplifies the allocation process for renewable energy 
compared to a set-aside. Generation data are easily collected as generators already track the 
information and state agencies already collect such data for other purposes. An output-based 
approach also eases the administrative process because all generators are allocated allowances 
using a single source of data. An output-based approach eliminates the need for regulating 
agencies to determine either a direct emission displacement rate or an allocation factor.  
Finally, generation output is a unit of measure that is neutral for all generating units. Under an 
output-based allocation system that gives allowances to all generators at the rate per kWh, there 
is no bias for or against any specific energy source based on vintage or fuel. An output-based 
system encourages development of the most fuel efficient energy sources, as well as renewable 
energy sources. 
 4.2.3 Disadvantages of Direct Output-Based Allocation to Wind Generators 
The approach of output-based allocation to wind generators has not been implemented as part of 
the primary allocation under previous emission reduction cap and trade programs, so the lack of 
operational experience is a disadvantage. Also, because such a program could allocate more 
allowances to renewable generators than a set-aside, some incumbent conventional generators 
oppose output-based allocation, complicating its implementation.v
Output-based allocation as a design choice overall is subject to the criticism, from a theoretical 
economic standpoint, that it subsidizes and therefore encourages output. Economic modeling 
studies have shown results consistent with theory, that updating output-based allocation can 
increase generation. However, if output-based allocation has been selected for the main 
allowance pool, this potential disadvantage is separate from the decision of whether to include 
renewable generators in the main allocation.   
On a more programmatic level, a full output-based program requires tracking of electricity 
output from all regulated sources. It may also include more, smaller renewable generators in the 
broader trading program, which may add complexity. 
                                                 
v Opponents of other non-emitting generating technologies also may oppose any increased use of output-based 
allocation, and proponents of those technologies may seek to be included in output-based allocation that is open to 
all generators.  
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In this section, we have identified the primary methods for including wind generation in cap and 
trade programs and explored their advantages and disadvantages. Next, we turn to the specific 
regulatory changes needed to incorporate wind generation into a particular program: the CAIR.  
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5. Incorporating Renewable Energy into the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule 
In March 2005, the U.S. EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) (70 FR 25162, 
5/21/05), which caps emissions in the 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia to 
significantly reduce the negative health and environmental impacts from nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The program will be implemented in two phases and is expected to 
reduce NOx emissions by 60% and SO2 emissions by 70% below 2003 levels at full 
implementation in 2015. States may be eligible to participate in an annual SO2, an annual NOx 
and/or ozone season NOx trading program (Figure 1), depending on whether the state needs to 
address PM2.5 nonattainment, ozone nonattainment, or both. 
 
 
Figure 1. States affected by the Clean Air Interstate Rule (U.S. EPA) 
Regulated states have the option of implementing the reductions through a regional trading 
program or through individual state emission reduction programs. If states choose to participate 
in the trading program, they must adopt a model rule issued by the U.S. EPA that lays out the 
basic structure of the program (70 FR 25162, 5/21/05). While most of the components of the 
model rule are fixed to ensure smooth administration of the trading program, states are free to 
determine the method of allocating NOx allowances to regulated entities. SO2 allowances 
continue to be allocated consistent with Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, so 
states do not have discretion on their distribution, and renewable energy cannot receive them at 
this time. 
The CAIR model rule does not include renewable energy in the program. However, the EPA 
does acknowledge the inclusion of renewable energy and energy efficiency as additional 
mechanisms to achieve the program’s emission reduction goals. EPA has provided guidance on 
including renewable energy and other emission reduction mechanisms in cap and trade programs 
[24].  
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The state response to CAIR can include any of the methods for incorporating renewable energy 
sources discussed in this report. Model CAIR language for alternative allocation methods, 
including the methods discussed in this paper, is provided in the August 2005 State and 
Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air Pollution 
Control Officials (STAPPA/ALAPCO) document, Alternative NO  Allowance Allocation 
Language for the Clean Air Interstate Rule [27]. This document simplifies the process of altering 
the model state rule under CAIR for states that wish to include renewable energy sources and 
provides the exact wording for multiple alternative allocation methods under the CAIR.
x
 This 
section provides background on the CAIR allocation approach and the options for including 
wind generators provided by the STAPPA/ALAPCO document.  
5.1 The EPA Model Rule 
The EPA model rule allocates allowances to existing sources on an input basis, and to new 
sources on a modified output basis. The allocation methodology for the annual NOx program is 
described in subpart EE section 96.142 of the model rule, and the allocation for the seasonal NOx 
program is described in subpart EEEE, section 96.342. The provisions of the two sections are 
essentially identical in construction, so the provisions of the sections are referred to jointly in this 
document (for example, as 96.x40 where x can be 1 or 3, meaning section 96.140 or 96.340). 
Section 96.x40 establishes the size of the state trading budgets. Section 96.x41 establishes the 
overall timing of the allocation programs, with the initial allocation in 2006 for the first 6 years 
of the program (2009-2014) and annual allocations thereafter. It also establishes procedures in 
case a state does not submit allocation data to the EPA. Section 96.x42 is the NOx allocation 
methodology itself. Within section 96.x42: 
• paragraph (a) describes how the heat input baseline is calculated for different types of 
units; 
• paragraph (b) establishes the number of allowances to be allocated and describes the 
allocation calculation; 
• paragraph (c) describes the new source set-aside; and 
• paragraph (d) governs the redistribution of unused allowances from the new source set-
aside. 
The model rule allocates allowances based on their historic (baseline) heat input. The first step in 
the allocation process is to calculate the baseline heat input for each unit. Each unit then receives 
allowances proportional to its share of the total baseline heat input in the state. The units are 
dealt with in two categories for the calculation of the baseline heat input: 
 
1. For older units (those that commenced commercial operation prior to 2001), the EPA 
approach is a fuel-weighted, heat input-based allocation. The baseline heat input for 
each unit is the three highest years of weighted heat input from 2000-2004. The heat 
input is weighted by 1.0 for coal-fired units, 0.6 for oil-fired units and 0.4 for other 
affected units. The allowances are allocated based on the weighted heat input.  
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2. For units that went online starting in 2001, the model allocation rule uses a modified 
output-based approach with credit for CHP. The baseline heat input for these is based 
on electric output converted to heat input. The converted heat input is the average of 
the unit’s three highest years of gross electric output for the first 5 years of operation 
converted to heat input using a heat rate of 7,900 British Thermal Units per kilowatt-
hour (Btu/kWh) for coal units and 6,675 Btu/kWh for other fuels. This converted heat 
input (not adjusted by fuel) is used to allocate allowances for the 2001 and later units 
from the same pool as the pre-2001 units. 
Once the baseline heat input is calculated for all of the affected units, the allowances are 
allocated based on each unit’s share of the total heat input. The allowances available for 
allocation to these units are the portion of the state electric generating unit (EGU) budget minus 
the new source set-aside.  
The initial allocation is in 2006 for the years 2009-2014. For the allocation in 2009 and each 
allocation thereafter, the allowances are reallocated for the year 6 years later. However, each 
unit’s baseline heat input, once established, does not change. Each unit’s allocation will also be 
reduced slightly as new plants come into the system and receive a share of the available 
allowances.  
There is a new source set-aside that provides allowances for new units until they have 
established their 5 years of baseline data. The set-aside for NOx is 5% per year for 2009 through 
2014 and 3% in 2015 and thereafter.w A new unit can request allowances equal to its actual 
emissions from the prior year. The allocation may need to be prorated to stay within the set-aside 
if it is oversubscribed. As new plants establish their 5 years of baseline data, they begin to get 
allowances in the regular reallocation. Since 5 years of data are required for the baseline and the 
initial allocation in 2006 covers 2009-2014, most units that begin commercial operation after 
January 1, 2001 will not have enough data for the initial allocation in 2006 and will not be able 
to receive allowances in the regular allocation process until 2015. 
5.2 Renewable Energy Set-Aside 
A renewable energy set-aside can be incorporated into the CAIR by defining eligible renewable 
energy sources in the initial section and adding a section that establishes both the amount of the 
set-aside and a method for allocation to renewable energy sources.  
Development of state-specific definitions of which renewable energy sources and what size 
projects are eligible, including specific definition of each eligible renewable resource, can avoid 
potential confusion on which sources are eligible for the set-aside. As discussed in the earlier 
section on renewable energy set-asides, placing a limit on size of eligible generators will 
decrease the administrative burden for the regulating agency but will exclude small projects from 
the set-aside allowance pool. Aggregation of small projects opens the opportunity for such 
projects and can be accomplished by including an additional definition. 
                                                 
w The EPA model rule erroneously lists these dates as “2009-2013” and “2014 and thereafter” in Section 96.x42 
(c)(1). These dates should be corrected to “2009-2014” and “2015 and thereafter,” independent of other changes. 
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Definitions - Section 96.x02 
Renewable energy unit means an electric generator or renewable energy project, equal 
or greater than 10 MWx, which began commercial operation after January 1, 2001 and 
is powered by wind, solar, ocean thermal, wave, geothermal, or hydroelectric energy. y
Renewable energy project means a group of renewable energy units that, in aggregate, 
equal at least 10 MW of rated capacity. 
The operation date of January 1, 2001 reflects the cutoff date for new sources in the CAIR. The 
renewable energy set-aside operation date can be altered to include existing renewable energy 
capacity or goals for renewable energy growth. If the date is set later, there is a larger portion of 
set-aside allowances for new renewable energy sources, creating a stronger incentive for 
development of new renewable energy sources. Conversely, a later date excludes existing 
renewable energy sources. Setting an operation date cutoff will require making tradeoffs between 
new and existing renewable energy generation. 
Once eligible units are properly defined, the set-aside language must identify the size of the 
renewable energy set-aside, how renewable energy units apply for allowances, how allowances 
are distributed among applicants, and how undersubscribed or oversubscribed allowances are 
handled. The STAPPA/ALAPCO language is based on other set-aside language in the model 
rule. The size of the renewable set-aside is typically 3% to 5% of the total allowance pool [26]; 
however, individual states will need to adapt this to their expectations of renewable generation 
and other state-specific considerations. The STAPPA/ALAPCO language bases the allowance 
allocation on an output-based emission factor. This is a simple approach that can be related back 
to the allocation in the main program. If the renewable set-aside is oversubscribed, the 
allocations are prorated based on generation. Any unused allowances from the set-aside are 
reallocated to the main allowance pool. The specific set-aside language follows. 
NOX Allowance Allocations – § 96.x42  
(d) For each control period in 2009 and thereafter, the permitting authority will 
allocate CAIR NOx allowances to qualifying renewable energy units in the State, in 
accordance with the following procedures:  
(1) The permitting authority will establish a separate renewable energy set-aside for 
each control period. Each new renewable set-aside will be allocated CAIR NOx 
allowances equal to 5% of the amount of tons of NOx emissions in the State trading 
budget under § 96.x40.  
                                                 
x The size cut-off was set lower than the main program’s 25 MW limit to include more projects. 
y The choice to include other renewable energy sources that emit NOx requires additional consideration and action 
by the state to properly define eligible units and evaluate the impact on overall emissions.  
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(2) The CAIR designated representative of such a renewable energy unit may submit to 
the permitting authority a request, in a format specified by the permitting authority, to 
be allocated CAIR NOx allowances, starting with the later of the control period in 2009 
or the first control period after the control period in which the energy efficiency or 
renewable unit commences commercial operation. The CAIR NOx allowance allocation 
request must be submitted on or before July 1 of the first control period for which the 
CAIR NOx allowances are requested and after the date on which the renewable unit 
commences commercial operation.  
(3) In a CAIR NOx allowance allocation request under paragraph (d)(2) of this section, 
the CAIR-designated representative may request for a control period CAIR NOx 
allowances in an amount not exceeding:  
(i) For a renewable energy unit, the control period gross electrical output of the facility 
during the calendar year immediately before such control period multiplied by 1.5 
lb/MWh for the years 2009-2014, or 1.25 lb/MWh for 2015and thereafter and divided 
by 2000 and rounded to nearest whole allowance as appropriate.  
(4) The permitting authority will review each CAIR NOx allowance allocation request 
under paragraph (d)(2) of this section and will allocate CAIR NOx allowances for each 
control period pursuant to such request as follows:  
(i) The permitting authority will accept an allowance allocation request only if the 
request meets, or is adjusted by the permitting authority as necessary to meet, the 
requirements of paragraphs (d)(2) and (3) of this section.  
(ii) On or after July 1 of the control period, the permitting authority will determine the 
sum of the CAIR NOx allowances requested (as adjusted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of 
this section) in all allowance allocation requests accepted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of 
this section for the control period.  
(iii) If the amount of CAIR NOx allowances in the renewable set-aside for the control 
period is greater than or equal to the sum under paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this section, 
then the permitting authority will allocate the amount of CAIR NOx allowances 
requested (as adjusted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section) to each CAIR NOx unit 
covered by an allowance allocation request accepted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this 
section.  
(iv) If the amount of CAIR NOx allowances in the new unit set-aside for the control 
period is less than the sum under paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this section, then the 
permitting authority will allocate to each CAIR NOx unit covered by an allowance 
allocation request accepted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section the amount of the 
CAIR NOx allowances requested (as adjusted under paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section), 
multiplied by the amount of CAIR NOx allowances in the new unit set-aside for the 
control period, divided by the sum determined under paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this 
section, and rounded to the nearest whole allowance as appropriate.  
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(v) The permitting authority will notify each CAIR-designated representative that 
submitted an allowance allocation request of the amount of CAIR NOx allowances (if 
any) allocated for the control period to the renewable unit covered by the request. 
Finally, the set-aside must be deducted from the main allowance pool for existing conventional 
units. In the CAIR model rule, the main allowance pool is 95% of total allowances from 2009 
until 2014, and 97% thereafter. This reflects the suggested set-aside for new sources of 5% and 
3% respectively. Once a renewable energy set-aside amount is determined, the main allowance 
pool percents should be adjusted accordingly. 
NOX Allowance Allocations – § 96.x42  
(b)(1) For each control period in 2009 and thereafter, the permitting authority will 
allocate to all CAIR NOx units in the State that have a baseline heat input (as 
determined under paragraph (a) of this section) a total amount of CAIR NOx 
allowances equal to 95% for a control period during 2009 through 2014, and 97% for a 
control period during 2015 and thereafter, of the tons of NOx emissions in the State 
trading budget under § 96.x40 (except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section). 
5.3 Direct Allocation to Renewable Energy  
While renewable energy set-asides have been used in the past, existing emission reduction cap 
and trade programs to date have not included an output-based allocation to renewable generators. 
However, the CAIR model rule already allocates allowances for new sources based on output, so 
it is easy to allocate allowances to new sources of renewable energy on an output basis. This can 
be accomplished by re-defining units eligible for new source allocations to include renewable 
energy sources. Once included in the definition, renewable sources can be allocated allowances 
from the main allowance pool at the same rate as other new units, where renewable energy 
generation output is multiplied by 6,675 Btu/kWh, the rate used for other fuels besides coal. An 
eligible unit for new source allocations can be defined as: 
Definitions - Section 96.x02 
Covered unit means a CAIR NOx unit, or a non-emitting electric generator or project 
with a nameplate capacity greater than [25 MW] that began commercial operation 
after January 1, 2001 and is powered by [wind, solar, ocean thermal, wave, 
geothermal, or hydroelectric energy]. 
The eligibility of various renewable energy technologies and capacity size would be determined 
by each state depending on its market for renewable energy sources. Non-polluting renewable 
energy sources provide the greatest emission reductions. This revised definition is then used as 
the basis for allocating allowances under Section 96.x42: 
(A)(1)(ii) For [covered units] commencing operation on or after January 1, 2001:  
    33  
5.3.1 Full Output-Based Allocation System 
While the existing CAIR model rule is a hybrid of heat input and output-based allocation 
systems, allocating the entire allowance pool under the CAIR based on generation output 
provides the strongest and most stable incentive for investment in clean, renewable energy and 
efficient conventional generators. A full output-based allocation would allow both existing and 
new renewable energy sources to receive allowances and realize their value through the market 
or through emission reduction claims. A full output-based system can be adopted under the 
CAIR by replacing the separate allocation for new and old units with one, consistent output-
based allocation approach for all units. 
§ 96.x42 CAIR NOx allowance allocations. 
 
(a)(1) The baseline generation (in MWh) used with respect to CAIR NOx allowance 
allocations under paragraph (b) of this section will be:  
 
(i) For each CAIR NOx [covered] unit that has operated each calendar year during a 
period of 5 or more consecutive calendar years, the average of the 3 highest amounts of 
the unit’s control period gross electrical output over the 5 years prior to the allocation 
year, provided that if a generator is served by 2 or more units, then the gross electrical 
output of the generator will be attributed to each unit in proportion to the unit’s share 
of the total control period heat input of such units for the year;… 
 
The definition of “covered” unit would be as discussed above. 
5.3.2 New Source Set-Aside 
The previous changes account for allocation to new sources, renewable and conventional, once 
they are eligible for allocations from the main allowance pool. However, new sources must 
establish a 5-year data baseline before they are eligible for allocation. Once the baseline is 
established, allowances are allocated for the year 6 years following the allocation. Thus there is a 
lag of approximately 12 years between the start-up of a new facility and the point at which it 
receives allowances under the primary allocation program. Under the current CAIR model rule, 
new sources are allocated allowances from a new source set-aside until they establish their 
baseline and start to receive regular allocations. 
The model rule suggests a new source set-aside equal to 5% of the total allowance pool from 
2009- 2014, and 3% thereafter. While receiving allowances from this set-aside, conventional 
generators can apply for allowances not greater than their emissions for the previous year. The 
set-aside allocation is designed to make conventional generators “whole” until they are able to 
receive allowances from the main allowance pool and does not require a reduction in emissions.  
If renewable generators receive allocations from a renewable energy set-aside, they can apply for 
those allowances as soon as they start to operate. If they are receiving allocations through a 
direct output-based allocation, however, they will be subject to the same 12-year lag as 
conventional generators and so would also need to be included in the new sources set-aside to 
receive any benefit during that time.  
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Non-emitting renewable energy generators cannot apply for allowances based on historic 
emissions, so the allocation can be based on a standard allocation factor until the new renewable 
energy sources meet the baseline period for direct allowance allocation from the main allowance 
pool.  
The required change is to modify the new source set-aside as follows: 
Section 96.x42 
(c)(2) The CAIR-designated representative of such a covered unit may submit to the 
permitting authority a request, in a format specified by the permitting authority, to be 
allocated CAIR NOx allowances, starting with the later of the control period in 2009 or 
the first control period after the control period in which the CAIR NOx unit commences 
commercial operation and until the first control period for which the unit is allocated 
CAIR NOx allowances under paragraph (b) of this section. The CAIR NOx allowance 
allocation request must be submitted on or before July 1 of the first control period for 
which the CAIR NOx allowances are requested and after the date on which the CAIR 
NOx unit commences commercial operation. 
(3) In a CAIR NOx allowance allocation request under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, 
the CAIR-designated representative may request for a control period CAIR NOx 
allowances in an amount not exceeding: 
(i) for CAIR NOx unit, the total tons of NOx emissions during the calendar year 
immediately before such control period. 
(ii) for a covered renewable generator, the control period gross electrical output of the 
facility during the calendar year immediately before such control period multiplied by 
1.5 lb/MWh for the years 2009-2014, or 1.25 lb/MWh for 2015 and thereafter and 
divided by 2000 and rounded to nearest whole allowance as appropriate. 
Even though the suggested set-aside is 5%, states can alter this amount to accurately reflect the 
expected growth of generation in their state. Inclusion of renewable generators in the new source 
set-aside may require states to increase the size of the set-aside.  
5.4 Decrease Lag Time for Allocations 
As noted above, there is an extensive lag time between receiving allocations from the new source 
set-aside and receiving allocations from the main allowance pool under the proposed allocation 
schedule for the EPA model CAIR. This time lag decreases the value of the allowance allocation 
to new conventional and renewable energy generators because of the potential that the new 
source set-aside would not be large enough to cover all applicants. This provides less incentive 
for new wind development. There are various methods to decrease the lag time in the CAIR, 
which would incorporate new sources into the main allowance pool more quickly and provide 
greater certainty of the allowance value to new non-emitting renewable energy sources. One 
method is to shorten the baseline period of generation for new sources from the suggested 5 
years to 3 years. This can be accomplished by adding the following section: 
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Section 96.x42 
(a)(1)(ii)(A) For units operating each calendar year during a period of at least 3 but 
less than 5 consecutive calendar years, the average of the 3 highest amounts of the 
unit’s total converted control period heat input over the consecutive years of operation. 
This will allow existing units in operation after January 1, 2001, as well as units that commence 
operation after the initial allocation, to move into the main allowance pool more quickly. The 
allocation period and the lag between allocation and allowance use can also be shortened (e.g., 
allocate allowances for the year 3 years after the allocation period rather than 6 years after). 
Appropriate wording for a shortened lag time can be found in the STAPPA/ALAPCO document 
[27]. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
Cap and trade programs are one of the leading policy choices to reduce emissions from 
electricity generation in the United States. Cap and trade programs use market-based trading of 
emission allowances to minimize compliance cost and provide flexibility to affected entities.  
Citing expected environmental and economic benefits, some programs include renewable 
generation. However, to date these programs have had little participation of renewable 
generators, including wind generation. As a non-emitting, increasingly competitive technology 
with growing generation capacity, wind is of particular interest because of its eligibility 
regardless of emissions or vintage restrictions of some programs, and the potential that the cap 
and trade incentive could make a difference in capacity expansion.  
If policymakers include renewable energy in cap and trade programs, there are several 
mechanisms by which wind generators can gain value from participating in the program: 
• If they receive an allocation of emission allowances and then sell them to emitting 
generators;  
• If they receive allowances and use them to enhance their participation in voluntary retail 
renewable energy markets; or  
• If they use them to make creditable emission reduction claims.  
• If the program design distributes allowances by auction instead of by free allocation, 
policymakers would need to decide how to spend auction proceeds and could choose to 
use them to benefit wind generators among others.  
Renewable generators, such as wind generation, can be incorporated in generation-based cap and 
trade programs in a manner that provides the strongest incentive, with minimal additional 
complexity, to achieve greatest overall benefits. There are two methods of accomplishing 
allocation of allowances to wind generators that are now in use or under consideration: 
• A renewable energy set-aside establishes a pool of allowances that can be allocated to 
wind generators, usually based on their generation output. Renewable set-asides have been 
established in several emission trading programs to date. They provide certainty to market 
participants on the amount of allowances that will be available for renewable generators. 
Two primary drawbacks of this approach reduce its effectiveness and its financial value as 
an incentive for wind project development: the set-aside may be too small to provide 
consistent value to all new wind generators in the long term, and the administrative costs 
for regulators and affected generators may exceed desired levels. 
• Direct output-based allocation to renewable generators allocates allowances to wind 
generators from the main allowance pool based on their generation output. This makes the 
generators part of the main allocation process and avoids additional administrative costs 
for regulators and affected entities. It also avoids the establishment of a fixed limit on 
allocations to wind generators. Drawbacks to this approach are that it has not been applied 
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in emission trading programs to date and that it faces greater political opposition than set-
asides because it could reduce the number of allowances that will be allocated to existing 
conventional generators in the long term.  
Sample regulatory language to allocate allowances to wind generators is straightforward and 
available. The CAIR represents the most immediate opportunity to apply this approach. Future 
trading programs, especially for CO2, may present similar opportunities. 
Experience to date suggests that participation of wind generators in cap and trade program is 
highly sensitive to transaction costs and regulatory issues. Continued evaluation of “best 
practices” for incorporating wind generation can improve design and implementation of these 
programs to increase their benefits.  
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Appendix A. Resources  
Cap and Trade Programs  
Acid Rain Program: 
Ellerman, A.D.; Schmalensee, R.; Joskow, P.L.; Montero, J.P.; Bailey, E.M. “Emission Trading 
Under the U.S. Acid Rain Program: Evaluation of Compliance Costs and Allowance Market 
Performance.” Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/napap.pdf  
 
Ellerman, A.D. “Lessons from Phase 2 Compliance with the U.S. Acid Rain Program.” Center 
for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 
2003. http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2003-009.pdf  
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Acid Rain Program, 2004 Progress Report.” Office of 
Air and Radiation, April 2004. http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cmprpt/arp04/2004report.pdf  
NOX Budget Program: 
Output-Based Allocation 
 
Fischer, C.; Fox, A. (December 2004). “Output-Based Allocations of Emission Permits.” 
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-04-37.pdf 
 
ERG; Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. “Output-Based Regulations: A Handbook for 
Air Regulators.” http://www.epa.gov/chp/pdf/OBR_final_9-1-05.pdf
 
U.S. EPA. “Developing and Updating Output-Based NOx Allowance Allocations.” May 8, 2000. 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/fednox/april00/finaloutputguidanc.pdf
 
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. “Analysis of Output-Based Allocation of Emission 
Trading Allowances.” http://uschpa.admgt.com/AllocationFinal.pdf
 
Alternative Allocations for Renewable Energy 
Wooley, D.R.; Morrs, E.M. (December 2000). “The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: 
Opportunities for Promoting Renewable Energy.” NREL/SR-500-29448. Golden, CO: National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy01osti/29448.pdf 
 
State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of Local Air 
Pollution Control Officials. “Alternative NOx Allowance Allocation Language for the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule.” http://www.4cleanair.org/Bluestein-cairallocation-final.pdf. August 2005. pp. 
14-16. 
 
 “Improving Regional Air Quality with Wind Energy.” (May 2005.) National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy05osti/38071.pdf
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Greenhouse Gases: 
Burtraw, D.; Palmer, K.L.; Kahn, D.B. (May 2005). “Allocation of CO2 Emissions Allowances 
in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program.” Resources for the Future. 
Wind Energy  
Wind Energy Overview: 
Reeves, A. (July 2003). “Wind Energy for Electric Power: A REPP Issue Brief.” Washington, 
DC: Renewable Energy Policy Project. 
http://www.repp.org/articles/static/1/binaries/wind%20issue%20brief_FINAL.pdf  
Economic Impact: 
Wind Economic Development. U.S. DOE/NREL Wind Powering America Program. 
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/windpoweringamerica/economics.asp  
 
Northwest Economic Associates for the National Wind Coordinating Committee. “Assessing the 
Economic Development Impacts of Wind Power.” February 2003. 
http://www.nationalwind.org/publications/economic/econ_final_report.pdf  
 
Pedden, M. “Analysis: Economic Impacts of Wind Applications in Rural Communities.” 
NREL/SR-500-39099. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, January 2006. 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/39099.pdf
Job Growth: 
Regional Economic Application Laboratory for the Environmental and Law Policy Center. “Job 
Jolt: The Economic Impacts of Repowering the Midwest.” 2001. 
http://www.repowermidwest.org/Job%20Jolt/JJfinal.pdf  
 
Hedge against Fuel Volatility and Cost Savings from Wind Energy:  
Piwko, R.; Bai, X.; Clark, K.; Jordan, G.; Miller, N.; Zimberlin, J. 2005. The Effects Of 
Integrating Wind Power On Transmission System Planning, Reliability, And Operations, Report 
On Phase 2: System Performance Evaluation. Prepared for the New York State Energy Research 
and Development Authority (NYSERDA), Albany, NY. Prepared by GE Energy, Energy 
Consulting, March 4 (See section 2.3.6). 
http://www.nyserda.org/publications/wind_integration_report.pdf  
 
Wiser, R.; Bolinger, M.; St. Clair, M. “Easing the Natural Gas Crisis: Reducing Natural Gas 
Prices through Increased Deployment of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency.” Berkeley, 
CA: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 2005. http://www-
library.lbl.gov/docs/LBNL/567/56/PDF/LBNL-56756.pdf  
 
Energy and Environment:  
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (April 2006.) “The Clean Energy-Environment Guide to 
Action.” http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/pdf/gta/guide_action_full.pdf 
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Appendix B. Resolution Supporting Emissions Allocations for 
New Clean Energy Sources 
 
WHEREAS, Encouraging cost-effective use of renewable energy resources has been an 
important national goal under past utility regulatory policy, including the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992; and 
WHEREAS, Renewable energy supply brings fuel diversity benefits and mitigates fuel  
market power in the nation's mix of energy supplies, and enhances national security,  
reduces dependence on imported fuels, and decreases environmental impacts; and 
WHEREAS, "NARUC's National Electricity Policy," adopted November 13, 2001,  
supports addressing all air emissions from all electric power generation in ways that: 1)  
minimize adverse environmental impacts; 2) are comprehensive and synchronized to 
reduce regulatory costs; 3) rely, to the extent possible, on market-based trading 
mechanisms, and 4) identify, to the extent possible, the net impact of resource decisions,  
including external factors, on public health, the environment and the economy; and 
WHEREAS, Renewable energy sources and efficient cogeneration facilities typically 
generate power with reduced air emissions, if any, compared to conventional power 
plants; and 
WHEREAS, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has proposed its "Clean Air  
Interstate Rule" (CAIR) which would, among other things, impose new emissions caps  
on power generating units and reserve for States the authority to allocate NOx emissions 
allowances within each State; and 
WHEREAS, Cap and trade programs traditionally do not allow a generator utilizing  
renewable energy to receive an emissions allowance allocation on the same basis as an 
equivalent fossil-fired generator; and 
WHEREAS, The exclusion of non-fossil generators from emissions allocations for new  
facilities places renewable energy sources at a disadvantage compared to fossil-fired  
resources and thereby perpetuates our nation's reliance upon finite fossil fuel resources;  
and 
WHEREAS, Under existing cap and trade programs, a generator utilizing efficient  
cogeneration technology receives no more emissions allowances than a conventional  
generator despite its superior efficiency; and 
WHEREAS, Under EPA’s new CAIR proposal, NOx allowances would be allocated to  
new generating sources based on output; now therefore be it 
RESOLVED, That the Board of Directors of the National Association of Regulatory  
Utility Commissioners (NARUC), convened in its 2004 Summer Meetings in Salt Lake  
City, Utah, urges Federal and State environmental authorities, in designing and  
implementing emissions cap and trade programs, to allocate emissions allowances in a  
manner that rewards efficient performance in new power generating facilities as EPA’s  
CAIR rule proposes; and be it further 
RESOLVED, That the NARUC further urges Federal and State environmental  
authorities to allocate emissions allowances equally to all new fossil and non-fossil  
generators, including renewables, according to their output. 
____________________________________ 
Sponsored by the Committee on Energy Resources and the Environment 
Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors July 14, 2004
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Appendix C. NO  Budget Trading Program Set-Aside Rationalesx
 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection: 
…to encourage and reward the development of emission-reducing energy 
technologies in the Commonwealth. Many energy efficiency and renewable 
technologies have not matured to the point where they can compete with existing 
electricity generation units on the basis of price alone. However, these 
technologies can provide significant benefits by reducing impacts on human 
health, air, water, and land from electricity generation, reducing costs to the states 
to comply with federal environmental requirements, and generating in-state 
economic benefits associated with expenditures in local energy efficiency and 
renewable energy industries.z
 
Indiana Department of Environmental Management: 
IDEM believes that the inclusion of a set-aside specifically for EE/RE projects 
will provide several benefits. By providing EE/RE projects with allowances that 
can be sold into the NOx allowance trading system, the set-aside will help to 
improve air quality by providing incentives to produce energy using low or zero-
emitting technologies and to prevent NOx emissions by increasing the efficiency 
of energy generation or use. Besides improving air quality, a set-aside that 
provides incentives for a variety of highly efficient or low emitting technologies 
will also diversify energy production in Indiana and provide greater system 
reliability.aa
 
New York State Energy Plan:  
The Set-Aside Program recognizes that emission reductions needed to meet air 
quality objectives can be achieved by implementing end-use electric energy 
efficiency measures and renewable energy projects as well as by installing control 
devices on fossil fuel-fired electricity generation sources. Ancillary environmental 
benefits of the program include year-round reductions of NOX emissions, thereby 
contributing to reducing acid deposition in the sensitive receptor areas of the 
Adirondacks, as well as reducing eutrophication (i.e., nutrient-loading) of water 
bodies such as the Long Island Sound. Furthermore, energy efficiency measures 
and renewable energy projects contribute to reducing emissions of carbon 
dioxide, the primary greenhouse gas, thereby providing long-term climate change 
benefits.bb
 
Elsewhere, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority has studied the 
effects of renewable electricity generation and noted potential economic benefits. cc  
                                                 
z http://www.mass.gov/dep/air/community/728rtc.pdf. SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND RESPONSE TO COMMENTS 
FROM PUBLIC HEARINGS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR OZONE, 
INCLUDING PROPOSED 310 CMR 7.28 Held: Monday, August 3, 1999 in Springfield, Massachusetts Tuesday, August 4, 
1999 in Boston, Massachusetts Thursday, October 28, 1999 in Boston, MA. 
aa http://www.in.gov/idem/programs/air/sip/guide.pdf 
bb http://www.nyserda.org/Energy_Information/energy_state_plan.asp 
http://www.nyserda.org/sep/sepsection2-3.pdf, June 2002, The 2002 State Energy Plan and Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (Energy Plan)  
cc http://www.nyserda.org/sep/EE&ERpotentialVolume1.pdf
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Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
Btu  British Thermal Unit 
CAIR  Clean Air Interstate Rule 
CHP  combined heat and power 
CO2  carbon dioxide 
EE/RE  Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
EGU  Electric Generating Unit 
GHG  greenhouse gas  
kW  kilowatt 
kWh  kilowatt-hour 
lbs  pounds 
MW  megawatt 
MWh  megawatt-hour 
NOX  nitrogen oxides 
PM2.5  particulate matter 
REC  Renewable Energy Certificate 
RGGI  Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
RPS  Renewable Portfolio Standard 
SIP  State Implementation Plan   
SO2  sulfur dioxide
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